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Notes
Home Rule Hits the Road in Illinois: American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Village of
Arlington Heights
The strength of free peoples resides in the local community.
Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to
science; they put it within the people's reach; they teach people
to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to
make use of it. Without local institutions a nation may give
itself a free government, but it has not got the spirit of liberty.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern structure of American municipal government is rooted
in the structure of the English municipal borough2 as it existed before
the colonization of the New World.' Most English municipal
boroughs vested control in a small group of politically powerful men
who filled every vacancy from within, much like a close corporation.4
As a general rule, the people of the boroughs did not have a voice in
their government. The people were willing, however, to subject
themselves to the caprices of their local rulers in exchange for protec-
tion from the tyrannical rule of the central government.6
In response to the growth of urban centers in the New World, the
American colonists adopted the familiar system of the English
borough.' In 1686, New York City became the first urban center to
adopt a charter which confirmed the borough's "ancient customs,
1. 37 ME. L. REV. 313,315 (quoting ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
55-56 (G. Lawrence trans., J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., 1966)).
2. The municipal borough included any incorporated urban area, making it the prede-
cessor to the American city. AUsTIN FAULKS MACDONALD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION 45 (5th ed. 1954).
3. In 1790, the first American census indicated that more than four-fifths of the total
white population was of English descent. Id. Thus, the majority of American city
governments were originally run by persons of English descent. Id.
4. Id. at 46.
5. id.
6. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 46.
7. Id. at 47.
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privileges, and immunities."8 Yet one important distinction separated
American municipalities from their English counterparts: The
American people controlled the composition of their governing coun-
cils through the popular vote, while the English councils were self-
perpetuating bodies.9
The purpose of the American municipal corporation is to perform
"local public functions as a subordinate branch of the state govern-
ment. '" The municipal corporation works for the benefit of its
people, but it is limited in its powers by its role as an arm of the
state."' Consequently, the municipality finds itself torn at times
between the competing interests of state government and municipal
citizens.
To accommodate the local interests of individual municipalities, state
legislatures often give municipalities the authority to grant certain fran-
chises.' 2  A franchise is essentially a government-granted privilege
given to a private entity to pursue certain activities for private profit. 3
Activities that have been permitted by franchise include supplying city
inhabitants with natural gas, collecting wharf tolls, and operating a
8. Id. Although the city of Agamenticus, Maine adopted a charter in 1641, and the
city of Kittery, Maine adopted one in 1647, New York's charter was the first one to
provide a stable long-term government. Id.
9. Id. at 49.
10. 12 MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 36.02 (3d ed. 1986). A
municipal corporation is defined as "[a] legal institution formed by charter from
sovereign (i.e. state) power erecting a populous community of prescribed area into a
body politic . . . for the purpose and with the authority of subordinate self-government
and improvement and local administration of affairs of state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1017 (6th ed. 1990). According to McQuillan, however, "while [the municipal corpora-
tion] is invested with full power to do everything necessarily incident to a proper
discharge of those public functions, no right to do more can ever be implied." 12
MCQUILLAN, supra, § 36.02.
1 1. It has been said that the municipal corporation:
[possesses] a dual character, the one public and the other private, and exercises
correspondingly twofold functions and duties--one class consisting of those
acts performed by it in exercise of delegated sovereign powers for benefit of
people generally ...and the other consisting of acts done ...for its own
benefit, or for benefit of its citizens alone, or citizens of the municipal corpo-
ration and its immediate locality.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1017 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Associated Enterprises, Inc. v.
Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 490 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Wy. 1971)).
12. 12 MCQUILLAN, supra note 10, § 34.01.
13. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (6th ed. 1990). In California v. Central Pac.
R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888), the Court defined a franchise as "a right, privilege or power of
public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their mere will
and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents." Id. at 40; see also 12 MCQUILLAN, supra note
10, § 34.01.
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community antenna television service.' 4
As a general rule, municipalities may not exercise a power-such as
granting a franchise-unless specifically authorized to do so by state
statute. 5 This rule can be qualified, however, by a state constitution
that grants select municipalities powers more extensive than those
specifically enumerated in statutes. 16 For example, a constitution may
provide that municipalities enjoying "home rule"'17 status possess all
powers related to their government and affairs, except for those
specifically withheld by law.' 8 Such broad powers contrast with those
of non-home rule municipalities, which generally possess only those
powers specifically granted by statute.' 9
Most states give municipalities, whether home rule or not, the
power to grant public utilities the right to erect, maintain, and operate
their systems under franchise agreements.2° Such an agreement may,
for example, allow the utility to use the city's public streets. 2' The
14. 12 McQUILLAN, supra note 10, § 34.03.
15. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
16. 12 MCQUILLAN, supra note 10, § 36.02.05.
17. For a full discussion of home rule powers, see infra notes 31-61, 88-95 and
accompanying text.
18. 12 McQUILLAN, supra note 10, § 36.02.05.
19. Id.
20. Roger D. Colton & Michael F. Sheehan, Raising Local Government Revenue
Through Utility Franchise Charges: If the Fee Fits, Foot It, 21 URB. 55, 56-57 (Winter
1989). Municipalities often grant franchises to gas companies, water companies,
telephone companies, and other public utilities. 12 McQUILLAN, supra note 10, §
34.01.
2 1. Colton & Sheehan, supra note 20, at 56-57. The grant of a right to use the public
streets of a city for water, light, heat, power, gas, telephone, telegraph services, or
railway services is a franchise and not a license or easement. McCutcheon v.
Wozencraft, 255 S.W. 716, 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923), aff'd, 294 S.W. 1105 (Tex.
1927). Contra Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Nashville, 243
S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that the right to use a public street is
an easement and constitutes a property right "'capable of assignment, sale, and mort-
gage, and entitled to all the constitutional protection afforded other property rights and
contracts"') (quoting City of Chattanooga v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 112 S.W.2d
385, 390 (Tenn. 1938)).
In the past, the power to:
grant franchises to use the streets was to a large extent withheld from
municipalities and vested in the legislature ...but the tendency of modern
legislation is to delegate to the local authorities the exclusive dominion over
the streets of the respective municipalities, and the value of local self-
government in this respect is self-evident, except perhaps where the public
utility is one in which the municipality is only incidentally interested,
because only a very small part of its operations are within its boundaries, as in
the case of an interstate telegraph company.
12 MCQUILLAN, supra note 10, § 34.01 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the
history and development of municipal franchises, see IOA McQUILLAN, supra note 10, §
1994] 579
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municipality may exact a franchise fee from the utility as compensation
for the right granted under the franchise agreement.22 In charging such
fees, however, the city must be careful to avoid imposing an unautho-
rized tax for the purpose of raising general revenue.23
Questions regarding the full nature and extent of the powers that can
be properly ascribed to municipalities formed the core of the debate in
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Village of Arlington
Heights24 ("AT&T II"). In AT&T II, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that an Illinois municipal corporation may not charge a telephone
company a franchise fee for the right to lay cable under public
streets.' The supreme court thereby reversed its previous decision in
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Village of Arlington
Heights26 ("AT&T r').
This Note analyzes the legal and practical implications that the
AT&T II decision will have on home rule and non-home rule munici-
palities in Illinois. First, this Note outlines the history of home rule
power in the United States and the development of home rule power in
Illinois.27 Next, it reviews the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation
of a municipality's power over the use of its streets in AT&T 11.28 The
Note then addresses how the AT&T I decision conflicts with Illinois
precedent and statutes.2 9 Finally, this Note examines the way in
which the AT&T II decision may alter the scope of home rule powers
in Illinois.3 °
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Home Rule Power
Prior to the development of home rule power, all municipalities
were subject to "Dillon's Rule," 3' which states:
34.01.
22. Colton & Sheehan, supra note 20, at 60-61.
23. Id. at 62.
24. 620 N.E.2d 1040 (I11. 1993).
25. Id. at 1042.
26. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097 (I11. Dec. 4, 1992), superseded on reh'g, 620 N.E.2d
1040 (Il1. 1993).
27. See infra part I1.
28. See infra part 111.
29. See infra part IV.
30. See infra part V.
3 1. Comment, Dillon's Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. REV. 693, 693 (1982)
(citing J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed.
1911) (footnotes omitted)). Judge Dillon, who wrote the first important treatise on the
580 [Vol. 25
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It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a munici-
pal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers
and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment
of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation .... 32
Relying on Dillon's Rule, the Illinois Supreme Court and other high
state courts historically treated municipal corporations as creations of
the legislature with no inherent powers.33 Even today, a municipality
that does not meet its state's requirements for home rule status is
subject to Dillon's Rule.34
Home rule power, which is unique to the United States and is the
antithesis of Dillon's Rule, is the power given to local governments to
create and adopt their own charters and to act in their own self-inter-
ests.35 The only restraints on home rule power are those expressly
law of municipal corporations, formulated the rule in an effort to capture the essence of
the limited powers possessed by a municipal corporation. Judge Dillon served as a
justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, was a distinguished federal judge, served as president
of the A.B.A., and was also a respected corporate lawyer. Id. at 693.
3 2. Dillon's Rule: The Case for Reform, supra note 31, at 693-94 (quoting J. DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911)). In a decision
by the Iowa Supreme Court, Judge Dillon further described the subordinate posture and
limited powers of municipal corporations:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and right
wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation . . .
the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corpora-
tions in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
Michael E. Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 URB. 645, 648-49 (Summer
1987) (quoting Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868)).
One commentator has noted that Judge Dillon later softened his "absolute position" on
the relationship between state sovereigns and municipal corporations, recognizing "'a
contrariety of opinion respecting the scope of legislative authority over municipal
corporations."' Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politics of City States in American Law, 1986 WISC. L. REV. 83, 89
n.44 (1986) (quoting J. DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 75
(1872)).
33. See, e.g., City of Ottawa v. Brown, 24 N.E.2d 363, 365 (I11. 1939); Cowin v.
City of Waterloo, 21 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Iowa 1946); Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 86 N.W. 69, 70 (Minn. 1901); Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. City of
Richmond, 133 S.E. 800, 803-04 (Va. 1926).
34. CHARLES R. ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 118 (3d ed. 1972). For a
discussion concerning non-home rule municipalities, see infra notes 62-87 and accom-
panying text.
35. See ADRIAN, supra note 34, at 117; see generally Dillon's Rule: The Case for
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imposed by a state's constitution or laws.36 Notwithstanding the
greater powers given to home rule municipalities, most are ultimately
subject in practice to the same state control over their affairs as non-
home rule municipalities. 37 Generally, the state legislature holds con-
current or superior power over local governments, particularly in those
areas which courts deem to be of state as opposed to local concern.38
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to depart from the essence
of Dillon's Rule and adopt a provision for home rule power in its
constitution. 39 The provision gave home rule power to any city with
more than 100,000 inhabitants.4° At the time, St. Louis was the only
city in Missouri that met the population requirement.4 1 In 1879,
California adopted a home rule provision identical to Missouri's
provision.42 California, however, later amended the provision in order
to limit municipalities' power over statewide concerns.43 Washington,
Minnesota, and New York also adopted home rule provisions before
the turn of the century. 44
In 1953, the American Municipal Association devised model home
rule constitutional provisions (the "Model"), which granted complete
autonomy to home rule municipalities with respect to "executive,
legislative and administrative structure, organization, personnel and
procedure. 45 Under the Model, the only limits on home rule power
Reform, supra note 31, and Libonati, supra note 32.
36. ADRIAN, supra note 34, at 117.
37. Id. at 118.
38. Id. On the subject of distinguishing local and statewide concerns, one commenta-
tor noted:
Even though every municipal ordinance or charter provision may have some
adverse impact on non-residents, there are numerous areas in which the impact
is so remote or is sufficiently counterbalanced by the interests of the munici-
pality that a court could not justifiably invalidate the ordinance or charter
provision on that ground alone.
Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 708-09 (1954); see infra note 90.
39. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 82.
40. Id. The provision allowed "[a]ny city with a population of more than one hundred
thousand inhabitants ... to frame a charter for its own government." Id.
41. Id. at 83.
42. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 84.
43. Id. at 85. The amended provision stated: "All charters framed or adopted by virtue
of this constitution, except in municipal affairs, shall be subject to and controlled by
general laws." Id. (emphasis omitted).
44. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 85. Washington adopted its provision in 1889,
and Minnesota adopted its provision in 1896. Id. New York adopted home rule in 1894.
Florence L. Cavanna, Note, Home Rule and the Secession of Staten Island: City of New
York v. State of New York, 8 ToURO L. REV. 795, 796 (1992).
45. MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (JEFFERSON
582 [Vol. 25
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are the requirements of a popular election of the members of legislative
bodies and judicial review of administrative proceedings.46 Currently,
more than forty state constitutions contain a provision for home rule,47
which has been labeled "'the most . . . flexible power system"' in
American local government.48
B. The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Home Rule Comes to Illinois
Before 1970, Illinois did not recognize home rule power. Indeed,
in 1954 the influential Chicago Home Rule Commission advised the
legislature that, although attractive, home rule was not a practical
choice for the State of Illinois. 49 Nonetheless, the Illinois legislature
FORDHAM, AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, Draft 1953), quoted in The Chicago Home
Rule Commission, A Reappraisal of Constitutional Home Rule, in MODERNIZING A CITY
GOVERNMENT 309 (1954). The Model was drafted by Dean Fordham. Id.; see also
Jefferson Fordham, Home Rule - AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 137 (1955).
46. A Reappraisal of Constitutional Home Rule, supra note 45, at 86. The Model has
been criticized for its limitations on the courts' power to curb home rule powers.
Sandalow, supra note 38, at 679. Opponents note that a court may not be able to limit
home rule powers under the Model, unless the court is "prepared to hold that the legisla-
ture could not confer the power upon a municipality." Id. at 691.
47. BARBARA W. SOLOMON & C. ALLEN BOCK, UNIV. OF ILLINOIS, HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS
1 (1977). By 1975, all states except Indiana, Mississippi, and Alabama had authorized
home rule power either by constitution or by statute. Cavanna, supra note 44, at 805
n.56 (quoting Judith A. Stoll, Note, Home Rule and the Sherman Act After Boulder:
Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 262 n.4 (1983)). Of
the forty states with constitutionally derived home rule power, half had adopted their
constitutional provisions by 1953. Id. Ten state constitutions allow county home rule,
although few counties have actually adopted their own charters. SOLOMON & BOCK,
supra, at 4.
Depending on the particular state constitution or statute, home rule power may be
available to all cities and villages (as in Oregon and Wisconsin), to cities over a certain
population (as in Illinois and Louisiana), as a self-executing provision of the state
constitution (as in Arizona and Nebraska), or only after legislation has specifically
authorized a city to avail itself of home rule power (as in Texas and Wisconsin). ADRIAN,
supra note 34, at 117.
48. JAMES M. BANOVETZ & ANN M. ELDER, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ARTICLE OF THE 1970
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION 2 (1987) (quoting William N. Cassella, Jr., A Century of Home
Rule, NAT'L CIVIC REV., Oct. 1975, at 448).
49. The Commission reported that the states with home rule had "effect[ed] a dilution
of the political concept of constitutional home rule to an extent which renders it a
symbol almost wholly devoid of substantive content and meaning." Samuel K. Gove &
Stephanie Cole, Illinois Home Rule: Panacea, Status Quo, or Hindrance, in PARTNERSHIP
WITHIN THE STATES: LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 153, 153-54 (1976)
(quoting CHICAGO HOME RULE COMMISSION, CHICAGO'S GOVERNMENT: ITS STRUCTURAL
MODERNIZATION AND HOME RULE PROBLEMS 309 (1954)). The Commission was uncertain
what the practical effects of including the term "home rule" in the Illinois Constitution
would be because "there is perhaps no term in the literature of political science or law
which is more susceptible to misconception and variety of meaning than 'home rule."'
CHICAGO HOME RULE COMMISSION, MODERNIZING A CITY GOVERNMENT 123 (1954).
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faced continual problems as it tried to formulate laws that could be
applied to both the large city of Chicago and smaller farming munici-
palities."
Prompted by increased legislative frustration, the delegates at the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention debated the merits of estab-
lishing home rule municipalities in Illinois.5 Ultimately, a home rule
provision was added to the 1970 Illinois Constitution.52 In Illinois, a
home rule "unit"53 may "exercise any power and perform any function
pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to,
the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt."' Home rule
power is not absolute, however. Although home rule power generally
extends to all matters of local concern, it does not include actions
expressly prohibited by the Illinois Constitution" or by United States
constitutional provisions requiring equal protection and due process.56
Still, the Illinois Constitution provides that home rule powers should
be liberally construed.5
In 1958, out of the ten largest cities in the nation, only three--Chicago, Boston, and
Pittsburgh-did not possess home rule power. ADRIAN, supra note 34, at 117.
50. Kurt P. Froehlich, Illinois Home Rule, in ILLINOIS LOCAL GOVERNMENT 225, 225
(James F. Keane & Gary Koch eds., 1990). Illinois contains 6,621 local governments-
more than any other state-within its boundaries. James D. Nowlan, Forward, in
ILLINOIS LOCAL GOVERNMENT at ix (1990). Municipalities make up 1,274 of all Illinois
local governments. Roland W. Burris, Local Government: The Big Picture, in ILLINOIS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT at 11, 12.
51. 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 3038 et.
seq. (1972). Most delegates clearly supported home rule. Id.
52. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. The constitution was ratified by a vote of 1,122,425 to
838,168 in a special election held December 15, 1970. SAMUEL K. GOVE, ILLINOIS
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
ILLINOIS 8 (1987).
53. In Illinois, any county that has a chief executive officer elected by the county's
constituents, and any municipality that has a population greater than 25,000, is consid-
ered a home rule unit. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). Other municipalities may elect home
rule status by referendum. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6(d)-(m). Specifically, Illinois courts have
held that home rule power extends to control of cigarette taxes, parking taxes, clerk
appointments, police chief appointments, admissions tax for racing, demolition proce-
dures, zoning for landfill sites, handgun prohibition, and the prohibition of Chicago
Cubs night baseball games. Froehlich, supra note 50, at 227-28.
Illinois courts, however, have declined to recognize home rule power over noise
regulation, an unwritten zoning moratorium, department head hiring and firing, certain
penal ordinances conflicting with the criminal code, discrimination based on personal
appearances, and disposition of unclaimed property. Id. at 229.
56. SOLOMON & BOCK, supra note 47, at 1.
57. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m). Section 6(m) was meant to halt the custom of
584 [Vol. 25
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Home rule power is valued by communities because it strengthens
the local government's autonomy58 and ability to respond flexibly to
the concerns of its constituents.5 An important purpose of home rule
power is freeing local governments from the fear that their every move
will be scrutinized by the judiciary.60 In effect, home rule status
allows a local government to implement its own policies in furtherance
of its goals without fear of reprisal.6'
C. Judicial Interpretation of Municipalities' Power Over Their Streets
1. The Power of Non-Home Rule Municipalities
The authority and power of non-home rule municipalities over the
use of their streets was established prior to the 1970 Illinois
Constitution, before which all Illinois municipalities were necessarily
non-home rule municipalities.62 During that period, Illinois courts
recognized a city's power to impose a charge, in the form of a rental
fee, for the use of its streets.63  This power derives from the city's
narrowly construing municipal power pursuant to Dillon's Rule. Froehlich, supra note
50, at 225. In practice, however, courts generally wield broad discretion in limiting a
municipality's power and do not "liberally construe" the power. Note, City Government
in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1604 (1965). This approach contrasts
sharply with that typically used by courts reviewing state and federal powers. Id. at
1602-03.
58. Local autonomy has been defined as "the capacity of local governments to act in
terms of their interest without fear of having every decision scrutinized, reviewed, and
reversed by higher tiers of the state [government]." Libonati, supra note 32, at 653
(quoting G. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CmEs 6 (1985)).
59. Libonati, supra note 32, at 653.
60. Id.
6 1. For a discussion of the powers of local governments, see Libonati, supra note 32.
Although this Note does not address a conflict between a local government and the state,
in such cases courts consistently favor state power over home rule power. Cavanna,
supra note 44, at 820. Such bias "'ignores the state's interest in supporting effective
local government, and in encouraging localities to develop their own decision making
mechanisms governing their own institutions."' Id. at 820-21 (quoting Michael E.
Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REv. 51, 68 (1989)).
In discussing the courts' role in municipal decisions, one commentator noted that "[t]o
decide that a local question should be answered at a higher level one must overcome the
argument that local people will be better informed about local problems and local feel-
ing and will have greater incentive to act." City Government in the State Courts, supra
note 57, at 1612.
62. See AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *14 (noting that "all of the cases that specifi-
cally discuss a municipality's power to prohibit use of its streets and . . . charge fran-
chise fees" pre-date the 1970 Illinois Constitution and, consequently, "involved the
statutory power of municipalities that were not home rule units").
63. See City of Springfield v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 97 N.E. 672, 674 (I11.
1912) (holding valid an ordinance that required a telegraph company to pay a municipal-
ity one dollar per telegraph pole as reasonable compensation for the use of its streets);
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general power to determine which uses of its streets are in the public's
best interests.64 Specifically, a city may exercise its power by
conditioning a utility's use of the streets upon the utility executing a
franchise agreement.65 Once executed, a franchise agreement becomes
a binding contract that cannot be revoked or rescinded by either the city
or the utility except for good cause.'
Generally, the powers of non-home rule municipalities are limited to
those specifically granted by the state legislature.67 Yet even where no
express statutory grant of power exists, Illinois non-home rule munic-
ipalities may have implied statutory authority to act. For example, in
the 1942 case City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co.,68 the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized that municipalities have implied
statutory authority to require private and public companies to enter
franchise agreements before they may use public streets.69 In support
of its ruling, the Geneseo court identified provisions in the Cities and
Villages Act 70 that individually and collectively grant municipalities
Chicago General Ry. v. City of Chicago, 52 N.E. 880, 881 (111. 1898) (holding that a
city may charge rental fees for the installation of track on city streets for a street railway
system); accord City of Corpus Christi v. Southern Community Gas Co., 368 S.W.2d
144, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (noting that the city had a right to impose a street
rental fee as consideration for granting a franchise). But see City of Springfield v.
Interstate Indep. Telephone and Telegraph Co., 116 N.E. 631, 633 (Il1. 1917) (limiting
a city's imposition of charges on a utility to amounts expressly stated in a city
ordinance).
64. City of Springfield, 116 N.E. at 638; see City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 68 N.E.2d
278, 281 (Il1. 1946) (stating that Illinois cities hold streets in trust for the public for the
purposes of travel and access to private property); Salem Nat'l Bank v. City of Salem,
198 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (noting that under the Illinois Municipal
Code, streets and sidewalks are held in trust by the city for public use); accord Cowin v.
City of Waterloo, 21 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1946) ("[M]unicipalities hold the streets
in trust for the public, and cannot put them to any use inconsistent with street purposes.
They have no implied power to grant privileges to use the streets for private
purposes.").
65. People ex rel. Jackson v. Suburban R.R., 53 N.E. 349, 352 (II1. 1899).
66. City of Vandalia v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 113 N.E. 65, 66 (IlI. 1916); see,
e.g., Village of London Mills v. White, 70 N.E. 313, 316 (Ill. 1904) (holding a
resolution granting the right to erect telephone poles and wires to be a contract binding
upon the city and telephone company); City of Belleville v. Citizens' Horse Ry., 38
N.E. 584, 588 (Ill. 1894) (stating that an ordinance permitting the use of city streets
constitutes a valid and binding contract when granted for valuable consideration);
Chicago Mun. Gaslight Co. v. Town of Lake, 22 N.E. 616, 617 (Ill. 1889) (holding that
a town ordinance that grants the right to lay pipes constitutes a contract upon
acceptance by the gas company).
67. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
68. 39 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 670 (1942).
69. Geneseo, 39 N.E.2d at 38.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 (1939) (current version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 65 (West
1992 & Supp. 1993)).
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power over their streets.7' Specifically, the provisions grant the power
to regulate the property of the municipality,72 the use of the streets,73
the placement of telegraph poles and street signs,74 the use of side-
walks and the space under them, 75 and the use of space over the
streets. 76 The Geneseo court found implicit in these powers the power
of a municipality to grant or withhold from utilities the use of city
streets.77
Although Geneseo allows a municipality to impose a franchise fee
under its implied statutory authority,78 that authority may be limited by
constitutional prohibitions on a local government's ability to tax. Nine
years after Geneseo, in Village of Lombard v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 7 9 the supreme court determined that absent specific statutory
authority, a municipality may not impose an occupational tax upon a
utility under the guise of a rental fee. ° Courts of other states have
similarly and consistently held that a local government has no inherent
power to tax.8 Moreover, even an explicitly granted power to tax
will be strictly construed by the courts.8 2
The Village of Lombard court also held that a municipality must
have specific statutory authority to charge public utilities rent for the
use of public property. 3 Some have argued, however, that in passing
7 1. Geneseo, 39 N.E.2d at 33; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65 (1939)).
72. Geneseo, 39 N.E.2d at 33 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65 (1939)).
73. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65.8 (1939)).
74. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65.16 (1939)).
75. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65.13 (1939)).
76. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 65.98 (1939)).
77. Geneseo, 39 N.E.2d at 34.
78. Id.
79. 90 N.E.2d 105 (I11. 1950), limited by Thorpe v. Mahin, 250 N.E.2d 633, 637 (111.
1969) (disavowing the statement in Village of Lombard that sections 1 and 2 of article
IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 limited the General Assembly to levying
property taxes, occupation taxes, and franchise or privilege taxes).
80. Village of Lombard, 90 N.E.2d at 108-10. See also City of Chicago Heights v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 94 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ii. 1950) ("[If] the collection of revenue
is the sole purpose for which the licenses are imposed, and such an ordinance ... exacts
a license fee ... [it] is a tax measure.").
81. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Morgantown. 71 S.E.2d 60, 63 (W.Va. 1952).
Indeed, courts narrowly construe any power to tax granted by the legislature. See, e.g.,
Pepin v. City of Danbury, 368 A.2d 88, 94 (Conn. 1976). Furthermore, any ambiguities
in a local government's power to tax will be resolved against the local government.
See, e.g., Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp. v. City of Stamford, 238 A.2d 410, 412
(Conn. 1968).
82. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 238 A.2d at 411-12.
83. Village of Lombard, 90 N.E.2d at 110. The Village of Lombard court reasoned
that municipalities have no inherent powers of their own to license or exact payment for
a privilege. Id. at 108. A municipality may derive any power in the nature of a tax only
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the 1955 amendment to the Revised Cities and Villages Act,84 the
legislature nullified this holding.85 The amendment appears to
authorize cities to levy certain taxes over and above other
compensation the cities receive for the use of their streets. 86 The
language of the statute, which is still in effect today, may override any
prior statute or judicial decision prohibiting a municipality from
collecting compensation for the use of its streets.87
2. The Power of Home Rule Municipalities
The 1970 Illinois Constitution brought home rule to Illinois, grant-
ing municipalities the authority to exercise any powers pertaining to
their "government and affairs. 88 This power includes the authority to
by way of an express legislative grant from the Illinois General Assembly. Id.
84. This amendment was named "An Act to amend Section 23-1 of the 'Revised Cities
and Villages Act,"' 1955 Ill. Laws 1900 (1955) (current version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch.
65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992)). The amendment stated in relevant part:
Any of the taxes enumerated in this Section may be in addition to the payment
of money, or value of products or services furnished to the municipality by the
[public utility] as compensation for the use of its streets, alleys, or other
public places, or installation and maintenance therein, thereon or thereunder
of poles, wires, pipes or other equipment used in the operation of the [public
utility's] business.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 23-113 (1957) (emphasis added).
85. In AT&T I, Justice Bilandic, writing for the majority, took the position that the
legislature repudiated Village of Lombard when it passed "An Act to amend Section 23-1
of the 'Revised Cities and Villages Act."' AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *13; see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 23-113 (1957). According to Justice Bilandic, the amendment
recognized that the powers granted therein were "in addition to" the powers that the
municipalities already had, namely to collect money for the use of streets and other
common places. See AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *13. Thus, in his view, the amend-
ment superseded the portion of Village of Lombard that restricted municipal authority to
charge compensation for the use of streets. Id.
In AT&T I1, however, the court majority took a different view of the impact the
amendment had upon Village of Lombard. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1045. The court
reasoned that if the legislature had intended to give municipalities the power to collect
money for the use of their streets, it would not have provided for municipal taxation of
electronic messages originating within a city and traveling under or through those
streets. Id.; see infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
86. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 23-113 (1957) (current version at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ch. 65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992)).
87. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *13 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2
(1987)).
88. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). "Home rule units thus have the same power as the
sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly." Triple A
Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Ill. 1989).
In contrast, other state constitutions allow a municipality to: (1) enact laws or regula-
tions "in respect to municipal affairs," (CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 8(j)), pertaining to their
"organization, government or affairs," (MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 3), and "relating to
[their] property, affairs or government," (N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 16); or (2) to "adopt and
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grant a franchise for the privilege of using public property for private
gain.8 9 The authority to grant the franchise, however, must constitute
authority over a local and not a statewide concern.90 Local and
statewide concerns are distinguished by examining several factors,
including the character of the concern, the governmental units
involved, and the roles traditionally taken by state and local govern-
ment in addressing the concern. 9' Specifically, the manner in which a
municipality's streets or other public property should be used has been
generally characterized as a matter of local concern.'
In addition to controlling the use of streets, Illinois courts have
recognized that home rule power includes the authority to require dedi-
cations of land for schools or parks as a condition of subdivision
approval,93 to prohibit the sale of produce on public ways,94 to grant a
enforce within their limits ...local police, sanitation and other similar regulations,"
(OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3). Sandalow, supra note 38, at 660. Because the use of these
phrases and the meanings ascribed to them vary among the states, courts have reached
different and sometimes conflicting interpretations of them. Id.
89. See AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *15 (upholding a municipality's power to
require a public utility to enter a fee-exacting franchise agreement for the privilege of
using municipal property), superseded on reh'g, 620 N.E.2d 1040 (111. 1993); ILL. ANN.
STAT., ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 24 (Smith-Hurd 1971);
Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 711 (I11. 1989) (upholding the City of
Chicago's power to regulate or prohibit use of its streets within the Chicago Medical
Center District).
90. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *15. Neither "local" nor "statewide" concerns have
been well defined. Even judicial definitions are often less than illuminating:
"Municipal affairs ...comprise the internal business of a municipality." Burkett v.
Youngs, 199 A. 619, 621 (Me. 1938) (citation omitted). However, "matters which
relate, in general, to the inhabitants of the given community and the people of the entire
State, are the prerogatives of State government." Id. at 622.
91. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274 (I11. 1984).
92. E.g., Geneseo, 39 N.E.2d at 33; AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *15. In some
jurisdictions a statewide telephone system, "with its need for coordinated intra and inter-
state communications," is considered a matter of statewide rather than local concern.
City of Englewood v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 431 P.2d 40, 43
(Colo. 1967); People ex. rel. Public Utilities Comm. v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 243 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1952); Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 336 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1959).
93. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 354 N.E.2d 489, 494 (II1. App. Ct. 1976), affd
on other grounds, 369 N.E.2d 892 (I11. 1977). The mandatory dedication of subdivision
land for roads and utility use was one of the earliest forms of control that courts deemed
as a reasonable means of ensuring responsible land development. Wendy U. Larsen &
Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees: Et Tu, Illinois? 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 489, 491
(1988). Yet Illinois-which is known as a "developer state"-has generally been
restrained in exacting fees or land from developers as a precondition for subdivision
approval. Id. at 492 (citing I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.17
(1974)). These practices are being more widely used, however, as alternatives to raising
property taxes. Id.
94. Witvoet v. City of Chicago, 354 N.E.2d 524, 528 (111. App. Ct. 1976); Triple A
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railroad franchise to a private business, and to vacate public streets for
the economic benefit of the city.95
III. THE AT&T II DECISION
A. The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions
American Telephone and Telegraph Company 96 ("AT&T") planned
to lay an underground fiber optic cable to carry long distance commu-
nications along an eighty-five mile route in northern Illinois. 97 The
Chicago and North Western Transportation Company ("CNW")
granted AT&T an easement to lay the cable beside a railroad roadbed.98
Although located on CNW's private property, 99 the roadbed inter-
sected 140 public streets, roads, and highways along the eighty-five
mile route.'0° Except for five municipalities-Arlington Heights,
Palatine, Barrington, Lake Barrington, and Crystal Lake-each munic-
ipality along the route granted AT&T permits for the resultant
"undercrossings" of municipal streets, at either no charge or for
minimal administrative fees.' 0'
The five municipalities that refused to grant AT&T the permits did
not object per se to the undercrossings; instead, they required that
AT&T assent to individual franchise agreements that would exact a fee
from AT&T. 0 2 The fees or tolls alternatively demanded by the
municipalities included a percentage of AT&T's gross revenues and a
Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 713 (I11. 1989).
95. Crain Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Mound City, 544 N.E.2d 1329, 1333 (iil. App.
Ct. 1989).
96. The FCC has designated AT&T the "dominant carrier" in the telecommunications
marketplace on the basis of three factors:
I. AT&T controls local access facilities for more than 80 percent of
America's telephones;
2. AT&T possesses the majority of the share of the most popular long
distance services; and
3. The revenues for AT&T's private line services were thirteen times greater
than the combined private line revenues of the other common carriers.
Howard Griboff, New Freedom for AT&T in the Competitive Long Distance Market, 44
FED. COMM. L. J. 435, 440-41 (1992) (citing Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, First Report and Order, 85
F.C.C.2d 1, 21-23).
97. AT&T 1I, 620 N.E.2d at 1042.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. AT&T I1, 620 N.E.2d at 1042. For a discussion of the nature of franchise agree-
ments, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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charge for each foot of cable installed. 0 3 After AT&T and the five
municipalities failed to agree on a fee arrangement, AT&T mailed the
municipalities notices announcing that it would begin cable installation
in ten days under the eminent domain authority granted to it by the
Illinois Telephone Company Act. 0 4 Ten days after serving notice
under the Telephone Company Act, AT&T began construction in
Palatine and Arlington Heights.0 5 The municipalities then ordered
AT&T to cease construction.'0 6
In response, AT&T sought to enjoin the municipalities from
interfering with the installation of the cableJ °7 The trial court granted a
preliminary injunction allowing AT&T to install its cable under any
103. AT&T 1I, 620 N.E.2d at 1042. AT&T rejected the proposal of the Northwest
Municipal Conference, an organization of municipalities appointed to represent the five
cities in this case. The Conference proposed that AT&T enter franchise agreements
similar to an existing agreement between AT&T and the City of Chicago, under which
AT&T agreed to pay a minimum of $5 million per year. AT&T I, 1992 WL 356097, at
*1; AT&T 1I, 620 N.E.2d at 1042-43. AT&T also rejected an alternative proposal that
would have required it to pay $2.50 per foot of cable installed within a municipality
regardless of whether the cable crossed any public streets. AT&T 1I, 620 N.E.2d at 1043.
The municipalities rejected AT&T's counteroffer to pay $1 per foot of cable located under
a public way plus administrative fees of $5,000 per year. Id.
104. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1043. The Telephone Company Act states, in pertinent
part:
Every such company may, when it shall be necessary for the construction,
maintenance, alteration or extension of its telephone system, or any part
thereof, enter upon, take or damage private property . . . and every such
company is authorized to construct, maintain, alter and extend its poles,
wires, cables and other appliances as a proper use of highways ... under and
across any highway, street, alley, water or public ground in this state, but so
as not to incommode the public in the use thereof: Provided, that nothing in
this act shall interfere with the control now vested in cities, incorporated
towns and villages in relation to the regulation of the poles, wires, cables and
other appliances, and provided, that before any such lines shall be constructed
along any such highway it shall be the duty of the telephone company ... to
give . . . notice in writing of the purpose and intention of said company to
construct such line ... [within] ten days before said line shall be placed . . .
and upon the giving of said notice it shall be the duty of said highway
commissioners to specify the portion of such road or highway upon which the
said line may be placed . . . but in the event that the said highway commis-
sioners shall, for any reason, fail to make such specification within ten days
after the service of such notice, then the said company ... may proceed to ...
erect its said line . . . by placing its posts, poles and abutments so as not to
interfere with other proper uses of said road or highway.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, para. 20 (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 220, §
65/4 (West 1992)).
105. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1043.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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public way controlled by the five municipalities.'0 8 The court also
ordered the parties to enter arbitration. 09 The municipalities appealed,
and the appellate court affirmed the injunction but reversed the
arbitration order."0
AT&T subsequently moved in the trial court to make the preliminary
injunction permanent."' In granting a permanent injunction, the trial
court determined that AT&T not only had the right to lay the cable
pursuant to the Public Utilities Act" 2 and the Telegraph Act," 3 but
also had the right under those Acts to operate the cable without disrup-
tion or interference." 4  The appellate court affirmed,' 15 with one
justice dissenting.'' 6
B. The Rulings of the Supreme Court
On review, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
five municipalities had the power both to prohibit AT&T from laying
cable under public ways without a franchise agreement and to demand
108. Id.
109. Id.
1 10. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1043.
111. Id.
112. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 220, § 5/13-202 (West 1992) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
111 2/3, para. 13-202 (1987)). The Act defines telecommunications carriers as
including:
[Elvery corporation, cohpany, association . . . or individual . . . that owns,
controls, operates or manages, within this State, directly or indirectly, for
public use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for or in
connection with . . . telecommunications services between points within the
State which are specified by the user.
Id.
113. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 220, § 55/4 (West 1992) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
134, para. 4 (1987)). The Act states in pertinent part:
No such company shall have the right to erect any poles, posts, piers,
abutments, wires or other fixtures of their lines . . . upon any public ground
within any incorporated city, town or village, without the consent of the
corporate authorities of such city, town or village.
Id.
1 14. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1043-44.
115. 576 N.E.2d 984, 991 (III. App. Ct. 1991). The appellate court held that:
[The] defendants do not have an absolute right to require a franchise agreement
as a prerequisite for the use of their public streets by plaintiffs, and that a
franchise agreement is not a necessary precondition for plaintiffs to utilize the
public streets of the defendant municipalities.
Id. at 992.
116. Justice Mary Ann McMorrow joined the Illinois Supreme Court after the AT&T I
decision. Since she authored the appellate court dissenting opinion prior to joining the
Illinois Supreme Court, she was unable to participate in the AT&T I1 decision. AT&T II,
620 N.E.2d at 1047.
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a toll or franchise fee under the agreement." 7 Following that ruling
and the retirement of three of its justices,"l8 the supreme court granted
AT&T's petition for rehearing. " 9 In reversing its previous decision,
the court affirmed the appellate court's decision, holding that
municipalities "do not have a proprietary interest in the public streets
and may not raise revenue by coercing telephone companies into
franchise agreements."' 20
Writing for the majority,12 ' Justice Heiple began the analysis by
distinguishing the character of AT&T's fiber optic cable installation
from other uses of public streets. 2 2 In particular, the court reasoned
that because the cable would traverse a substantial portion of Illinois,
interest in the cable was statewide rather than purely local. 123 The
court opined that allowing every affected municipality to charge a "toll"
such as that proposed by the five municipalities would amount to
"legalized extortion and a crippling of communication and commerce
as we know it.' '
24
In assessing the powers held by the five municipalities, the court
characterized all powers over public streets granted to municipalities by
the General Assembly as regulatory, rather than proprietary, in
nature. 25 The court concluded that the only compensation such regu-
117. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *3. See infra notes 145-73 and accompanying
text for a full discussion of the majority's decision in AT&T I, which was fully incorpo-
rated into the dissenting opinion in AT&T I.
118. Three justices from the original four-justice majority in AT&T I retired in
December 1992. Justice Mary Ann McMorrow of the First Appellate District succeeded
Justice Clark, Justice John Nickels of the Second Appellate District succeeded Justice
Moran, and Justice Moses Harrison of the Fifth Appellate District succeeded Justice
Cunningham. Ruth E. VanDemark, The Illinois Supreme Court's 1992 Season: The
Civil Arena, 81 ILL. B.J. 296, 306 n.132 (June, 1993). The only survivor of the AT&T I
majority, Justice Bilandic, wrote the AT&T II dissenting opinion. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d
at 1048.
119. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1042.
120. Id.
121. Justice Heiple delivered the opinion of the court. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1041.
Justice Freeman wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1047. Justice Bilandic wrote a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 1048.
122. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1044.
123. Id. at 1045.
124. Id. Justice Heiple noted that "there are 1,281 cities and villages in Illinois, 102
counties and 1,434 townships, each of which maintain traveled ways." Id.
125. AT&T I1, 620 N.E.2d at 1044. "A 'proprietary function' is one designed to
promote comfort, convenience, safety and happiness of citizens." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1219 (6th ed. 1990). The Illinois Supreme Court has characterized propri-
etary powers as "private" ones. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *4. The supreme court
has also suggested that revenue-raising measures, such as charging franchise fees or
property rents, are exercises of proprietary powers, whereas recovering actual costs
incurred by a municipality in accommodating a private enterprise constitutes an exercise
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latory powers would permit the five municipalities to demand from
AT&T would be the actual costs incurred by the municipalities in
allowing the installation and operation of the cable. 26 Specifically
addressing a provision of the Revised Cities and Villages Act that
permits a municipality to collect compensation for the use of its
streets, 127 the court found it regulatory in nature and thus not valid
authority for a municipality to impose a "toll" on wires placed under
the streets. 28 The court viewed a second statutory provision, which
expressly allows municipalities to impose a 5% tax on the gross
receipts of electronic communication businesses that "originate" within
municipal boundaries, 2' as reinforcement for its position that
municipalities hold only regulatory powers over the use of their
streets.1
30
The court next shifted its focus from the five municipalities' powers
to the rights of AT&T. The court accepted AT&T's argument that the
of a municipality's regulatory powers. AT&T If, 620 N.E.2d at 1042, 1046. In sum,
whether a municipality is wielding its "proprietary power" in a particular situation is
particularly difficult to determine.
126. AT&T I1, 620 N.E.2d at 1046.
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2(4) (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ch. 65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992)). The relevant provision provides:
Any of the taxes enumerated in this section may be in addition to the payment
of money ... to the municipality by the taxpayer as compensation for the use
of its streets, alleys or other public places, or installation and maintenance
therein, thereon or thereunder of poles, wires, pipes or other equipment used in
the operation of the taxpayer's business.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992). See AT&T H, 620 N.E.2d at 1045.
128. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1045.
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2(4) (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ch. 65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992)). Section 8-11-2 provides in pertinent part:
The corporate authorities of any municipality may tax any or all of the
following occupations or privileges:
1. Persons engaged in the business of transmitting messages by means of
electricity or radio magnetic waves, or fiber optics, at a rate not to exceed 5%
of the gross receipts from such business originating within the corporate
limits of the municipality.
Any of the taxes enumerated in this section may be in addition to the
payment of money, or value of products or services furnished to the municipal-
ity by the taxpayer as compensation for the use of its streets, alleys, or other
public places, or installation and maintenance therein, thereon or thereunder
of poles, wires, pipes or other equipment used in the operation of the
taxpayer's business.
Id.
130. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1045. The court stated: "If the General Assembly
intended to give municipalities the right to use the public streets as revenue-raising
devices, it would have been unnecessary to explicitly provide for a way to tax electronic
messages and to impose a 5% cap upon such a tax." Id.
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Telephone Company Act 131 granted AT&T eminent domain authority
to use any public street for the installation of wires. 13 2 Acknowledging
that the Telephone Company Act requires that AT&T give notice and
obtain municipal consent prior to wire installation, the court stressed
that a municipality must consent to a reasonable request. 33 Because
AT&T's undercrossings would not interfere with public health or simi-
lar concerns, the court reasoned, the five municipalities were not
permitted to withhold consent. 13
4
The court did not address in detail the differences between home
rule and non-home rule municipalities. 135 In the court's view, because
neither the Illinois Constitution nor any statute expressly grants any
municipality the right to charge tolls, both home rule and non-home
rule municipalities alike are prohibited from charging tolls. 136
C. The Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Freeman limited his agreement
with the majority's judgment to the specific facts of the case. 137 He
identified two aspects of the case that the majority had not stressed but
which he viewed as justifying the result reached by the majority.'38
First, Justice Freeman stressed that the fees were improper because
the proposed undercrossings would effect only an incidental presence
in the municipalities and would facilitate a service that did not originate
or terminate within the individual municipalities. 3 9 Still, Justice
Freeman did not preclude the possibility of municipalities imposing
tolls under different circumstances.' 4° By his reasoning, the justifica-
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, para. 20 (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch.
220, § 65/4 (West 1992)). See supra note 104 for the pertinent part of this statute.
132. AT&T I, 620 N.E.2d at 1045.
133. Id. at 1046 (citing City of Vandalia v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 113 N.E.
65, 66 (I11. 1916)). The AT&T I court characterized a reasonable request as one that
takes into account public health, safety, necessity, and convenience. AT&T I, 620
N.E.2d at 1046.
134. Id. The court found that the collection of a fee was not sufficient grounds for
denying AT&T's request. Id.
135. Id. at 1047. The court glossed over any distinction between the two types of
municipalities by concluding that "[m]unicipal governments, whether home rule or non-
home rule, are creatures of the Illinois Constitution." AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1046.
136. Id.
137. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1047 (Freeman, J., concurring).
138. Id. (Freeman, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Freeman, J., concurring). Justice Freeman stated: "It merely happens that
completion of the network requires AT&T to snake the cable alongside railroad track
into and out of the municipalities, inevitably intersecting public streets. AT&T is just
passing through, as it were." Id.
140. Id. (Freeman, J., concurring). Justice Freeman merely concluded that the unique
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tion for a toll becomes stronger "[tihe closer a private entity is joined,
economically speaking, to a municipality through use of municipal
property."''
Second, Justice Freeman reasoned that it was unnecessary for the
majority to conclude that the imposition of franchise fees by the munic-
ipalities would constitute an impermissible exercise of proprietary
power. 4 2 He asserted that the mere presence of underground cable
does not justify the assertion of any municipal power over city streets,
because such cable will not affect the municipality or the public in any
discernible way. 43 Therefore, Justice Freeman reasoned, the majority
need not have classified fees on underground cable as either propri-
etary or regulatory, because the five municipalities could not have
exercised even regulatory power over the cable unless the installation
or presence of the cable could be characterized as compromising the
use or enjoyment of the streets by the public as a whole. 44
D. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, 145 Justice Bilandic criticized the majority
for effectively repeating the dissenting opinion found in AT&T J.146
Justice Bilandic stated that in addition to his own argument, his dissent
in AT&T 11 incorporated the opinion of the court in AT&T J.147
Accordingly, that opinion is reviewed below.
In AT&T I, the court began by positing the rule that municipalities
hold title to the streets in trust for the public's benefit. 48 The court
facts of AT&T II warranted the rejection of such a toll. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1047
(Freeman, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Freeman, J., concurring).
142. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1047-48 (Freeman, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 1048 (Freeman, J., concurring). Justice Freeman stated that the imposi-
tion of a fee had been found justified in the past when the use could "be characterized as
one that compromises enjoyment by the public of the whole of city streets for their
normal object: facilitating travel." Id. at 1047.
144. Id. (Freeman, J., concurring). Justice Freeman explained as follows:
Existence of fiber optic cable under streets does not impede the public's
enjoyment of the whole of city streets for permitting travel over and upon.
The need to declare that no municipal proprietary power exists is eliminated
by the absence of a type of use sufficient to invoke it ... I would not discount
such municipal power without greater exploration by the court as to why that
should be so.
Id. at 1048 (Freeman, J., concurring).
145. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1048-57 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1049 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
148. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *4 (citing IOA MCQUILLAN, supra note 10, at §
28.38).
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stated further that the public has a vested right to use the public streets
for traveling in the ordinary course of business. 149 Concluding that
running cable beneath the streets is an extraordinary 5 ° use of the
streets, the court suggested that a municipality has the right to impose
conditions on extraordinary uses pursuant to its role as trustee for the
public. "5 '
The court next addressed the role of franchise agreements in munic-
ipal affairs, observing that the legislature is the original holder of the
power to grant franchises, but may delegate that power to
municipalities. 52 In order to determine whether the legislature had
indeed delegated that power to the five municipalities-two of which
were home rule and three of which were not-the court distinguished
between the broad powers of home rule municipalities and the more
limited powers of non-home rule municipalities.'53
The court first noted that non-home rule municipalities 54 may grant
franchise agreements only if authorized to do so by statute. 5 5 The
court recognized that under Illinois case law, non-home rule munici-
palities have implied statutory authority to prevent a public utility from
using their streets without a franchise, 5 6 to permit all uses of their
streets that are consistent with normal use,' 57 to enter franchise
agreements permitting utilities to use the streets for purposes other than
normal use, 58 and to impose conditions on a utility before the rights
granted under a franchise may be exercised. 59 Based on this prece-
149. Id. at *4 (citing Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 169 N.E. 22, 25
(11. 1929)).
150. Any use of the streets other than for ordinary travel appears to be an
"extraordinary" use. See id. at *4 ("AT&T seeks the privilege of using the streets in an
extraordinary manner. AT&T does not want to use the streets as a means of travel.").
151. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *4.
152. Id. at *5.
153. Id. For a discussion of the differences between the powers held by home rule and
non-home rule municipalities, see supra notes 31-95 and accompanying text.
154. Of the five defendant municipalities, Barrington, Lake Barrington, and Crystal
Lake were non-home rule municipalities. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *5.
155. Id. at *5 (citing 12 MCQUILLAN, SUpra note 10, at §§ 34.10a, 34.13).
156. Id. at *6. (citing People ex rel. Jackson v. Suburban R.R., 53 N.E. 349, 352
(II1. 1899); Olsen v. City of Chicago, 184 N.E.2d 879, 880 (I11. 1962); Coles-Moultrie
Elec. Cooperative v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 476 N.E.2d 1303 (111. App. Ct.
1985)).
157. Id. at *7 (citing Sears v. City of Chicago, 93 N.E. 158 (II1. 1910); City of
Springfield v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 97 N.E. 672 (I11. 1912); City of Springfield
v. Inter-State Indep. Telephone and Telegraph Co., 116 N.E. 631 (111. 1917)).
158. ld. (citing Chicago Municipal Gas Light and Fuel Co. v. Town of Lake, 22 N.E.
616 (Il1. 1889)).
159. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *7 (citing City of Springfield v. Inter-State
Indep. Telephone and Telegraph Co., 116 N.E. 631 (II1. 1917); City of Springfield v.
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dent, the court concluded that a non-home rule municipality may
impose a fee as a condition to a franchise agreement allowing an
extraordinary use of public streets."
The court next noted that in contrast to non-home rule municipali-
ties, home rule municipalities derive their power from the Illinois
Constitution, which allows a home rule unit to "'exercise any power
and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs."",1
61
The court added that the General Assembly may pass legislation that
limits the powers of home rule municipalities or declares that the
state's exercise of certain powers shall be exclusive.162 The court
observed that the legislature has not limited home rule units' power to
impose fees on public utilities under franchise agreements. 163
Consequently, the court reasoned, such a fee is valid as long as it
pertains to a unit's "government and affairs."'' The court concluded
that the fees sought by the five municipalities met this requirement. 65
After he incorporated the AT&T I majority opinion into his dissent,
Justice Bilandic criticized the AT&T H majority for not acknowledging
the differences between the powers possessed by home rule and non-
home municipalities. 66  He suggested that this oversight may
ultimately reduce the powers home rule units are allowed to exer-
cise.16
7
Further, Justice Bilandic concluded that the oversight violated the
separation of powers doctrine, arguing that the majority's ruling
constituted a legislative act. 68 He stressed that the legislature will be
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 97 N.E. 672 (I11. i912); Chicago General Ry. v. City of
Chicago, 52 N.E. 880 (I11. 1898)).
160. Id. at *8 (citing City of Springfield v. Inter-State Indep. Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 116 N.E. 631 (Ill. 1917); City of Springfield v. Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co., 97 N.E. 672 (I11. 1912); Chicago General Ry. v. City of Chicago, 52 N.E. 880 (I11.
1898); Lobdell v. City of Chicago, 81 N.E. 354 (II1. 1907); Broeckl v. Chicago Park
District, 544 N.E.2d 792 (Iil. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1005 (1990); MacNeil v.
Chicago Park District, 82 N.E.2d 452 (I11. 1948)).
161. Id. at *14 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a))(emphasis omitted).
162. Id. (citing ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(i)).
163. AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *14.
164. Id. at *15.
165. Id.
166. AT&T H, 620 N.E.2d at 1051 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
167. See AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1052 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Justice Bilandic
also took issue with the majority's assertion that home-rule units do not possess the
power to regulate issues of statewide concern; he contended that "even matters exten-
sively regulated by the State are matters which properly fall within the exercise of a
home rule municipality's power." Id.
168. Id. at 1054 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). The 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:
"The General Assembly may provide specifically by the law for the exclusive exercise
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found to have limited home rule power only if it "specifically and
expressly states its intent to do So, ' ' 169 and concluded that the legisla-
ture has expressed no such intent.'70 Thus, Justice Bilandic reasoned
that the majority had usurped a legislative power by limiting the
authority of home rule municipalities.' 7 ' He asserted that the
majority's exercise of a legislative power is the exact situation that the
drafters of the home rule provisions were trying to prevent. 2 Finally,
Justice Bilandic cautioned the majority that they might have implicated
the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of Illinois citizens by
violating their right to be governed under a tripartite system.17 3
IV. ANALYSIS
The AT&T II decision directly conflicts with Illinois Supreme Court
precedent and applicable statutory law, and ignores the constitutional
distinction between the powers of home rule and non-home rule
municipalities. Consequently, AT&T II will likely cause confusion as
courts try to discern the contours of home rule power. Moreover,
AT&T II suggests that the supreme court is strictly construing the
powers of home rule units under the Illinois Constitution, rather than
liberally construing them as expressly specified in the constitution. 4
by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit ...."ILL. CONST. art. VII, §
6(h). Section 6(i) of the constitution states: "Home rule units may exercise and perform
concurrently with the state any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that
the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or
specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
The Illinois Constitution further provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
169. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1054 (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (citing Kalodimos v.
Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (I1. 1984); Stryker v. Village of Oak Park,
343 N.E.2d 919 (11. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976); Rozner v. Korshak, 303
N.E.2d 389 (Il. 1973) (emphasis deleted)).
170. AT&T II, 620 N.E.2d at 1054 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
172. Justice Bilandic posited that "the home rule provisions were specifically drafted
in their present form to eliminate the possibility that courts might preempt or limit
home rule powers through judicial interpretation." Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting) (citing
Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. 1992)).
173. Id. at 1055 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Justice Bilandic remarked: "Illinois
citizens' right to be governed by a system of separated powers is a matter of liberty-a
substantive due process right-granted to us by the fundamental law of our State consti-
tution." Id.
174. The Illinois Constitution states that the "[plowers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m). The role of the court is
not to set limits on municipal power, but merely to "police the boundaries that have
been placed around legislative action without undermining the basic assumption that the
people's representatives are the best qualified and safest group to which to entrust most
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By not acknowledging and applying the distinction between home
rule and non-home rule powers, the AT&T II court disregarded the
intent behind the 1970 Illinois Constitution.'75 The delegates at the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention adopted home rule because
they were seeking "to strengthen local government-to free the
General Assembly from having to deal with a host of minor bills...
in areas where they have little knowledge.., to encourage local initia-
tive . . . to encourage people at the local level to meet new and
expanding responsibilities.' 76  The delegates emphasized that the
powers of home rule units would derive from the constitution and
were not embodied in any specific statute. 77 Hence, contrary to the
court's reasoning in AT&TII, the absence of specific statutory author-
ity is an insufficient reason to conclude that home rule municipalities
may not require public utilities to pay fees for the extraordinary use of
municipal streets. Home rule power comes from the constitution, not
from statutes.178
decisions." City Government in the State Courts, supra note 57, at 1603.
175. In Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 711 (111. 1989), the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized the importance of drawing a distinction between home rule
and non-home rule powers. In that case, the court criticized the appellate court for
basing its decision on case law involving non-home rule municipalities when ruling on
a case involving a home rule municipality. Id. Because the appellate court failed to draw
the distinction, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that the appellate court had never
even reached the proper issue. Id. at 712.
In AT&T 1I, the Illinois Supreme Court did not take its own criticism to heart. The
minimal discussion of home rule power in the majority's decision suggests that the
opinion is analytically deficient, especially in light of the court's prior emphasis on the
differences between home rule and non-home rule municipalities.
The Illinois Supreme Court is not the only court to fail to draw a proper distinction be-
tween home rule and non-home rule powers. See, e.g., Wilshire v. Newman, 31 P. 564
(Cal. 1892). Such shortcomings in judicial analysis have been criticized:
[A]fter nearly a century of experience with home rule, no definition of the
extent of municipal initiative has evolved. Courts have sometimes used their
power to determine whether a city has stayed within its home-rule grant in
much the same way that courts in non-home-rule states decide whether munici-
pal decisions conform to state policy. In determining whether home rule
gives a city the power to make a certain decision, courts sometimes look to
decisions in non-home-rule states and to pre-home-rule decisions in the same
state.
Sandalow, supra note 38, at 645.
176. 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 51, at 3039.
177. Id. at 3040. One delegate stated: "The powers... are not powers that come by
way of statute. [T]hese are autonomous powers that home rule units can exercise within
their corporate limits without regard to statutory enablement." Id.
178. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. In states where home rule
power is granted by the state constitution, courts should ask two questions to determine
if a particular action is outside the scope of home rule powers:
1. "Was the action undertaken for a municipal purpose?"
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Moreover, even non-home rule municipalities, which do derive their
power from statutes, have the authority to charge a fee under a
franchise agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the implied statutory authority of municipalities to impose a
fee as a condition of a franchise agreement that allows an extraordinary
use of public streets. 7 9 In sum, the AT&T I1 court erred both by fail-
ing to distinguish between home rule and non-home rule powers and
by disregarding Illinois precedent on the powers generally held by all
municipalities.
The AT&T II court expressed concern that franchise fees like the
ones demanded by the five municipalities would cause "a crippling of
communication and commerce as we know it.' 180 Yet AT&T already
pays millions of dollars per year in franchise fees similar to those
challenged in AT&T H1.181 Since AT&T apparently faces no danger of
financial ruin from these fees, the court's concerns seem misleadingly
exaggerated.
The court also incorrectly relied on Village of Lombard,182 thereby
leaving AT&T I1 without a solid foundation in Illinois law. Although
the Village of Lombard court ruled that a municipality did not possess
the power to rent its public streets, the legislature specifically amended
the Revised Cities and Villages Act five years after Village of Lombard
to include a provision recognizing a municipality's authority to collect
such compensation.183 The AT&T II court dismissed this amendment
with the terse statement that it "neither allows municipalities to tax the
user of public streets nor does it allow the taxation of wires under the
2. "If so, was that action expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or
special law, or charter?"
12 MCQUILLAN, supra note 10, at § 36.02.05. In AT&T 11, the majority did not undertake
any specific analysis of the actions taken by the two home rule municipalities.
In general, a court may deny a power to a home rule municipality "upon the ground that
the legislature has determined that the state has a greater interest or that it is a more
appropriate forum than the city council for resolving the problems dealt with by the
regulation." Sandalow, supra note 38, at 665-66.
179. See supra notes 64-77 and 156-60 and accompanying text.
180. AT&T H1, 620 N.E.2d at 1044.
18 1. American Telephone and Telegraph v. Village of Arlington Heights, 576 N.E.2d
984, 986 (I11. App. Ct. 1991).
182. For a discussion of Village of Lombard, see supra notes 79-86 and accompany-
ing text.
183. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2(4) (1987) (current version at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ch. 65, § 5/8-11-2 (West 1992)). The amendment states that "[any of the taxes
enumerated in this section may be in addition to the payment of money . . . to the
municipality by the taxpayer as compensation for the use of its streets .. or installa-
tion and maintenance ... thereunder of.. . wires .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-
11-2(4) (1987).
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streets."' 84 Yet the court failed to recognize that the five municipalities
did not seek to impose a tax based on the municipal authority to tax,
nor did the municipalities rely upon the power to exact revenue
through licensing. 85 Rather, the municipalities premised the franchise
fees upon the municipal power to regulate the streets-a power histori-
cally recognized in Illinois. 86 Therefore, the court's focus on statutes
restricting the municipal power to tax 87 was inappropriate; the court
should have focused instead on a municipality's power to regulate the
use of its streets.
The court also misconstrued other statutory authority. It observed
that the Telephone Company Act 88 grants telephone companies
"eminent domain authority over private property and the power to use
any public ground of this State which is necessary for the extension of
telephone poles, wires, cables or other appliances."'' 89 The court
recognized that AT&T was required to seek municipal consent prior to
laying its cable.' 90 It reasoned, however, that the failed franchise
agreement negotiations between AT&T and the five municipalities
constituted an unreasonable and thus invalid refusal of consent by the
municipalities.' 9' Yet the municipalities' actions were not unreason-
able. The municipalities did not completely refuse to allow the
installation of the cable. 92 Rather, they attempted to negotiate a valid
franchise agreement for the undercrossings.
93
184. AT&T 1!, 620 N.E.2d at 1045.
185. See City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893)
(holding that a charge imposed for the right to erect telephone poles is a rental fee and
not a tax).
1 86. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
187. See AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1045 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2
(1987)).
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, para. 20 (1987). For the relevant text of the statute,
see supra note 104.
189. AT&T H, 620 N.E.2d at 1045. In her dissenting opinion at the appellate court
level, Justice McMorrow observed that the Illinois Commerce Commission has issued
AT&T a certificate of public necessity and convenience to operate its telecommunica-
tions system in Illinois. American Telephone & Telegraph, 576 N.E.2d at 993
(McMorrow, J., dissenting). She noted that under the Public Utilities Act, the certificate
should not be interpreted as conferring a franchise, license, or other power on AT&T. Id.
(McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 8-406 (1987)).
Justice McMorrow concluded, therefore, that the certificate does not grant AT&T "the
automatic right to use public streets for its stated business purpose." 576 N.E.2d at 993
(McMorrow, J., dissenting).
190. AT&T HI, 620 N.E.2d at 1046.
191. Id.
192. "It is to be noted that none of the municipalities object to the installation of the
cable per se." Id. at 1042.
193. Id.; AT&T 1, 1992 WL 356097, at *1-2.
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V. IMPACT
The AT&T II decision both nullifies a municipality's power to regu-
late a public utility's use of its streets and grants public utilities the
right to use public streets for private gain without compensation.
Additionally, the AT&T II court's failure to take into account the
important distinction between home rule and non-home rule munici-
palities may lead to similarly confused treatment by lower courts and,
ultimately, to improper restrictions on the home rule powers granted
by the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
The court's implicit endorsement of AT&T's refusal to negotiate
franchise agreements in good faith sets the stage for similar abuses in
the future. The court has rendered virtually meaningless the statutory
requirement that a telephone company obtain a municipality's consent
before using public streets for private gain.194 When a telephone com-
pany requests consent from a municipality in the future, it need do so
only as an administrative formality, rather than as a genuine effort to
obtain consent. The company may merely serve notice, pretend to
negotiate for ten days, reject any proposals, and begin installation after
ten days-for free. Thus the court has effectively stripped municipali-
ties of their ability to negotiate. Telephone companies now possess the
power to unilaterally invoke eminent domain authority without any
substantial checks, either judicial or statutory.195
Ultimately, then, AT&T and other similar utilities can now routinely
194. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 104.
195. It has been observed that in cases like AT&T If, "[tlhe question to be answered is
not whether an issue is political, for courts are regularly charged with the responsibility
of deciding political issues, but whether it is the type of political issue toward the
resolution of which the courts can make a contributi.on." Sandalow, supra note 38, at
688.
The question in AT&T I1 is clearly political. The court, however, is not the proper
forum to rehabilitate failed negotiations. By stepping into the midst of negotiations
and orchestrating the outcome, the court severely undercut the possibility of the parties
reaching a genuine compromise. Like fighting siblings who run to their parents, two
parties who have failed to compromise will be able to submit their dispute to the courts
with the knowledge that they do not need to even attempt to negotiate because the court
will ultimately decide the issue.
This is not to say, however, that the courts do not have a role in issues regarding home
rule powers. A lawsuit filed by an individual who is "disadvantaged by municipal legis-
lation provides an opportunity for continuous, if nonetheless episodic, review of such
legislation to determine its consistency with the welfare of the larger community. In
discharging this responsibility, the courts have the advantage of comparative freedom
from local pressures." Sandalow, supra note 38, at 702. Moreover, interest groups may
receive fairer treatment on the state level, where greater objectivity may exist, than at
the local level, where individual and more parochial interests may prevail. City
Government in the State Courts, supra note 57, at 1612.
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reject proposed franchise agreements and then merely invoke their
unprecedented and largely unqualified right to use the public streets for
private purposes. 196 The AT&T H decision thus directly contradicts
more than 100 years of Illinois case law. 197  Consequently, lower
courts now have little guidance on how to restrain utilities when future
disputes over municipal franchise agreements arise.
Furthermore, the AT&T II decision may ultimately reduce the
powers rightly held by home rule municipalities. The court's failure to
honor the distinction between home rule and non-home rule powers
implicitly condones a narrowed judicial interpretation of the home rule
powers granted by the Illinois Constitution. Specifically, the court's
analysis tacitly rejects the notion that the powers possessed by home
rule municipalities exceed those of non-home rule municipalities. 98
This proposition of course directly contradicts the Illinois
Constitution.'99 As it stands, the Illinois Supreme Court has strictly
construed the powers of home rule units-to the point of a reversion to
196. In her dissenting opinion, Justice McMorrow noted that the decision of the
Illinois Appellate Court could result in improvident judicial intrusions into municipal
affairs:
In place of ... negotiation, the majority allows AT&T to obtain a judicial
interpretation of whether the various proposed and non-binding franchise fees
suggested by the municipalities were reasonable . . . [T]he imposition of a
franchise fee for use of public streets is an inherently legislative function, and
whether a particular franchise fee arrangement should be imposed is, in the
first instance, a matter within the province of the municipalities and their
residents. This court is certainly not the proper forum to debate the relative
merits of the various franchise arrangements . . .that should be resolved by
the residents of the municipalities through their elected officials.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 576 N.E.2d at 997 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting)(citation ommitted). Justice McMorrow's position is similar to Justice
Bilandic's dissenting opinion in AT&T 1I. See supra notes 145-173 and accompanying
text.
197. See supra notes 62-95 and accoinpanying text.
198. One commentator summarily rejects the notion that courts have restricted home
rule power, noting: "Contrary conclusions by commentators are frequently unsupported
by reference to judicial decisions ... These unsupported conclusions are then relied on
as tending to prove similar conclusions by later commentators." Sandalow, supra note
38, at 663 n.87. In AT&T 11, however, the restriction placed on home rule powers is
clear: Although case law has firmly established municipalities' power to control use of
their streets, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled to the contrary. For a list of cases
upholding municipal power over their streets, see supra notes 156-60 and accompanying
text.
199. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Dillon's Rule.200 The people have been stripped of a portion of their
power to effectively govern themselves at the local level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In AT&T II, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a municipal
government may not charge a franchise fee for the right to lay cable
under public streets.2 °' The court thus reduced the authority of
municipalities to control the use of their streets and broadened the right
of utilities to use public streets for private gain without compensation.
Because the court implicitly condoned AT&T's refusal to compromise,
municipalities have lost the effective ability to negotiate franchise
agreements. As frustrated attempts to negotiate agreements lead to
lawsuits, AT&T II will leave courts struggling to resolve disputes with
an inconsistent body of case law.
ELIZABETH A. FEGAN
200. According to one commentator, the same situation has arisen in Nebraska:
"[Tihe law of municipal home rule in Nebraska is embalmed in Dillon's Rule instead of
being enshrined in the state's constitution." Arthur B. Winter, Municipal Home Rule, A
Progress Report? 36 NEB. L. REV. 447, 471 (1957); see supra note 32 and accompanying
text for Dillon's Rule.
201. AT&T 11, 620 N.E.2d at 1042.
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